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IN  AN  interview at the end of 1955,  Jean Monnet, that Frenchman who  has 
untiringly been the driving force in the movement for  European integration, 
said:  "The United  States  of Europe,  means:  a federal  power linked  to  the 
peaceful exploitation of  Atomic Energy"  .1 
An important step  was  taken  in this  direction  two  years  later  with  the 
creation, on January 1, 1958, of a European Atomic Energy Community called 
Euratom. This was but a first step; the formula seemed so extreme that many, 
and some with a degree of  success, tried to act as moderators. Yet, as it stands, 
Euratom-so  its  name  shows-is  truly  the  product  of  the  fusion  of 
two  contemporary  revolutions:  the  European  revolution  and  the  atomic 
revolution. 
I.  THE  EuROPEAN  REvoLUTION 
The Second World War saw the end of a long and fruitful period in Man's 
evolution:  that of the history written by the divided countries of Europe.  In 
order to ensure their economic progress-a condition they must fulfil if  they are 
to remain independent-the nations of Europe must unite. 
Everything compels  them to  do  so.  Their peoples, greatly  shaken by the 
repeated horrors born of  nationalistic excesses, are ready to begin the building of 
a new European equilibrium. Their leaders, deeply disturbed by the decline of 
European influence throughout the world, cannot foresee  any possible future 
without a broadening of markets and a co-ordination of policies. Together the 
peace and prosperity of Europeans, without which fruitful exchanges with the 
rest of  the world cannot exist, make European unity imperative. In the minds of 
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the Europeans there has come to be a revolution defined by W.  Ropke as  "a 
gradual awakening of  conscience and an aspiration toward unity". 
Very soon after the Second World War, events were to give this new European 
spirit a chance to express itself. The two major post-war problems facing the 
nations of  Western Europe were undoubtedly the growing Soviet domination of 
Central Europe and the dollar shortage. Both have been at the source of  repeated 
efforts towards co-operation. 
On September 19, 1946, in a famous speech delivered at Zurich, Sir Winston 
Churchill solemnly underlined the need for a reconciliation and the hope for 
a unification  of Europe.  Three years  later, fifteen  countries  of Western and 
Mediterranean Europe joined together in the Council of Europe where Govern-
ments on the one hand, and Parliamentary delegations on the other, periodically 
compare their views on European problems and help further the conclusion of 
arrangements for co-operation. 
On June 5, 1947, in a speech no less famous delivered at Harvard, General 
Marshall  proposed  that  the United  States  support the  concerted  effort  the 
nations of Western Europe were undertaking to restore their economy, ruined 
by war. Less than a year later, the fifteen  countries of the Council of Europe 
founded the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (O.E.E.C.), with 
which the United States and Canada became associated.  This institution set 
itself one immediate objective: to allocate American aid with a general view to 
eliminating duplication and promoting the development of a healthy European 
economy.  It also  proposed a  permanent objective:  to further the progressive 
economic  unification  of Europe.  To this  end, the O.E.E.C.  strove to lessen 
quantitative restrictions and to set up a multilateral payments system, thus re-
establishing the bases required for a flow of  trade among the countries belonging 
to  the Organization.  Moreover,  through  facilities  opened  by the  permanent 
contacts  between the national delegations,  the O.E.E.C  •. created a climate of 
general economic co-operation, in which the abolition of tariff barriers between 
member countries has been considered. 
Progress, though very real, seemed slow. The states facing each other in the 
Council of Europe and in the O.E.E.C. were sovereign states, all enjoying the 
right of veto on any issue before them. The most varied, if  not contradictory, 
characteristics of  the several national economies led to conflicts of  interest ending 
frequently in inaction or poor compromise. Since the rhythm of  World Evolution 
was gaining speed every day, it became apparent that a more efficient method of 
co-operation was indispensable. 
On May 9,  1950,  M. Robert Schuman proposed that an active and well 
organized united Europe be achieved through integration. Integration borrowed 
from the federal system the method of  pooling some fields of activities under a 
single authority exercising in all the integrated countries  powers  which  until 
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the interested parties.  A  general economic integration would have  implied a 
federal political system for which the countries of  Western Europe were not yet 
ready. The first experience had perforce to be limited, but it had to be nonetheless 
decisive.  It had to have  a  deep  meaning,  both politically, by bringing about 
a  Franco-German  reconciliation  without  which  no  European  structure  was 
possible,  and  economically,  by  selecting  a  fundamental  sector  which,  once 
unified, would be the embryo of a greater integration. That is why the French 
Government proposed to "place the entire coal and steel production of Germany 
and France under a common High Authority, in an organization open to the 
other countries of Europe". 
Less than a year later, Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Italy,  Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands  signed  a  treaty  instituting  the 
European Coal  and  Steel  Community  (E.C.S.C.)  which  was  ratified  with  a 
heavy majority vote by the  parliaments  of the  six  countries.  The E.C.S.C. 
began operating in August, 1952. 
1.  European Coal and Steel Community 
With the creation of  this first European Community, the existence of  common 
economic objectives  was  formally  recognized:  economic expansion,  increased 
employment and a higher standard of  living in the member states. The E.C.S.C. 
is to help reach these objectives by creating, in the coal and steel field, a common 
market governed by the terms of  the Treaty. Free circulation within the common 
market is the necessary condition for a sensible distribution of  industries, and, in 
the end, for the achievement of the common objectives: 
(a) Economic barriers between the member states of the Community must 
be abolished. This elimination implies not only the abolition of customs duties 
and of  quantitative restrictions, but also the freedom of  movement of  qualified 
workers as well as the prohibition of  aids and discriminations emanating from 
Government  source~, either direct, as  in the case of subsidies, or indirect, 
as  in the  case  of discriminatory  transportation  rates.  Distortions  resulting 
from the disparity in the general economies of the member states should be 
compensated if  they seriously affect competition between the enterprises of  the 
Community. This competition, freed from the distortions inflicted upon it by 
the public measures adopted by the member states, must be protected against 
the  manoeuvres  of the  enterprises  themselves,  which  in  fact  might  also 
jeopardize free circulation of  the Community's goods. That is why the common 
market prohibits discriminatory or dishonest sales practices, as well as agree-
ments between enterprises which might  have the effect of  falsifying, restricting 
or barring competition. Concentrations are subject to previous authorization. 
Enterprises making an abusive use of their dominant position to circumvent 
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(b) Periods of  economic disequilibrium in the common market may revive 
arbitrary disparities which are eliminated in normal periods by free circulation 
rules. In such cases, the common institutions must make sure that regulations 
are observed in the common market. It is better to prevent than to cure. In 
order to promote stability in expansion,  an  overall survey of the common 
market will be constantly kept up to date by the publication of all available 
information, programmes and general objectives. Investments conforming to 
the rational development of the Community will be encouraged, as the case 
may be, by the granting of  financing facilities which the Community, through 
its credit can extend to the enterprise. The enterprises concerned are warned 
against the risks implied in other investments. Finally, if, in spite of the joint 
efforts of private initiative and community regulations, an economic crisis or 
a serious shortage arises, the common institutions, if necessary,  would again 
intervene. 
(c)  Integration,  even  in a limited  sector,  of national  economies  so  long 
divided cannot possibly take place all at once. Under the Treaty, a five-year 
transitional period was established and special safeguards were applied, under 
well-defined  ~onditions, with the agreement  and  under the control of the 
common institutions. 
It is evident, then, that the role of these common institutions is fundamental. 
Consequently their organization is of  great importance. Integration requires that 
organizations formed to give effect to the concept be independent, and that powers 
hitherto  exercised  in  each  member  state  by  the  highest  national  authority 
be transferred  to  new  institutions.  The common democratic  tradition of the 
countries of  Western Europe demands that the executive power be controlled by 
the  judicial  and  parliamentary  branches  of the  government.  The fact  that 
integration is  limited  to  one  sector  of the  economy  makes  it essential,  for 
the  functioning  of the  Community, that  there be  a  co-ordination  between 
the  decisions  taken,  by  the  Common  Authority  in  the  integrated  sector 
and by  the  national  authorities  in each  member  state  as  regards  the other 
sectors of their economic life. 
A High Authority, composed of nine members who  are independent from 
their national governments, wields the executive power ofE.C.S.C. A Consulta-
tive Committee, comprising producers, workers, consumers, and businessmen in 
the field of coal and steel in all six countries, has the task of  informing it about 
the opinions  of those professionally concerned.  A Council of Ministers com-
prising one member from each national government has  to be consulted by the 
High  Authority  on  most  important  decisions,  and  makes  possible  frequent 
exchanges of  views about harmonizing the economic policies of the Community 
in the coal and steel sector with those of the member states in their economy in 
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Decisions  taken  by the  High Authority,  as  well  as  those  the Council of 
Ministers may take, either in administrative matters or in case of regulations 
formulated under the E.C.S.C. Treaty, can be referred for judicial review to the 
Court of Justice, composed of seven judges and of two advocates-general-all 
independent of their national governments. 
The High Authority is politically responsible for its activities to a Common 
Assembly, numbering seventy-eight persons designated by the national parlia-
ments from among their own members proportionately to the populations and 
interests of each member state. Lacking the legislative power which is insepar-
able from a real political federation, the Assembly nevertheless exercises a form of 
parliamentary control: by a vote of censure taken with a two-thirds majority on 
the annual report which the High Authority must present on its activities, the 
Common Assembly can force the Authority to resign in a body. 
By affirming common objectives, accepting common regulations and common 
institutions, the six countries of the E.C.S.C. launched a  new  phase  of the 
European revolution. 
The six  countries wished to associate with their new venture all the other 
countries of Western Europe willing to make the same decisions. Great Britain, 
invited from the first to join, showed interest but maintained an attitude of  "wait 
and see". She had a representative accredited to the High Authority immediately 
after this institution began functioning. In December 1954, she concluded with 
the Community, whose experience was  proving to her both its solidity and its 
efficiency, an agreement creating an organic liaison between the British Govern-
ment on the one hand, and the High  Authority  and the governments of the 
member states on the other. The purpose of the liaison was to proceed jointly 
with studies, negotiations, and proposals which might encourage trade among 
the  associated  countries.  Various  countries  of Western  Europe,  such  as  the 
Scandinavian  states,  sent representative'S  to  the High Authority.  Switzerland 
and Austria, linked to the states of the Community by their common interests 
as  neighbours,  also  concluded  with  the  High  Authority  agreements  of a 
limited scope. The United States for its part had also shown its interest in the 
E.C.S.C.  at an early date by naming a  U.S.  representative to the Authority, 
with the rank of Ambassador,  and later by extending  a $100 million loan to 
that agency. 
The creation and the success of the Coal and Steel Community imparted to 
the idea of a United Europe two notions which were to play a prominent role: 
that of  the transfer of authority to common institutions, and that of a common 
market. As a trial test for the realization of both these objectives, the E.C.S.C. 
offers a guide and, in many respects, a precedent. The role of  innovator played by 
this first experience in integration justifies even more than its immediate fruitful 
bearings on European economy the place it holds in the history of  contemporary 
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2.  The  Setting for E.E.C. and Euratom 
The E.C.S.C. was  hardly under way  when a vast attempt at military and 
political integration was begun. Presented too soon to populations ill-prepared 
for it, technically unsatisfactory, apparendy superfluous in a so-called climate of 
detente, the European Defence Community (E.D.C.) met with failure before the 
French Parliament on August 30, 1954. 
Despite the confusion  which  followed  this  failure,  the movement  toward 
European integration was to start again, and without delay, in the economic field. 
Meeting at Messina  in June  1955, to  name a successor  to  Jean Monnet, the 
resigning President of the High Authority, the Foreign  Ministers  of the six 
countries of  the E.C.S.C. adopted a resolution which constituted the charter of 
"the relaunching of Europe". 
This relaunching was  to require simultaneous efforts in several directions. 
The situation of the energy reserves  of Europe demonstrated the urgency of 
following a co-ordinated policy of  wide scope in that field. Lessons gleaned from 
the first years of  the Coal and Steel Community threw a useful light on the weak-
ness of  an integration limited to specific sectors of  the economy, and showed that 
the success of  specialized drives, for example in the field of  energy, was linked to 
the  progress  toward  general  economic  integration.  The Messina  Resolution 
declared that "the time had come to take another step toward the construction of 
Europe", and "that it was now necessary to strive to establish a united Europe 
through the development of  common institutions, the gradual fusion of  natioxlal 
economies, the creation of  a common market, the gradual harmonization of  their 
social policies". The resolution then proceeded to set multiple objectives: the 
constitution of  a common market, to be completed by the creation of  a European 
Investment Fund and by a gradual harmonization of  social regulations in use in 
the member states;  joint  development of the main  communication systems; 
co-ordination of  the development and use of  various sources of  energy in general 
and in particular the development of the peaceful uses of  atomic energy. 
At Messina a committee of governmental delegates from the six countries of 
the E.C.S.C. (in which the British Government was invited to participate) was 
formed under the chairmanship of Paul-Henri Spaak, then Foreign Minister of 
Belgium, and was given the task of preparing a general report for the Ministers. 
The report was  presented in April 1956.  While very summary as  regards the 
co-ordination of  energy and of  communications, it provided a well advanced study 
for a common market and for  an  atomic  energy  organization, already  called 
Euratom. 
Meeting in Venice in May 1956, the six Foreign Ministers decided to adopt 
this report as the basis for drafting a Treaty to establish a common market and 
another to set up Euratom. An Intergovernmental Conference, also presided over 
by M. Spaak, was  charged to prepare draft treaties, expressly leaving the way 
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strongly stimulated at the end of 1956 by the political repercussions of  the Suez 
affair and of the Hungarian uprising, required several meetings of the Foreign 
Ministers. Finally, a meeting of  the Heads of  Governments in Paris in February 
1957, was necessary to settle remaining political questions. The following month 
a treaty instituting a European Economic Community (E.E.C.), that is to  say 
organizing a general common market among the six  countries,  and  a treaty 
instituting a  European Atomic  Energy  Community (Euratom) were signed in 
Rome. Ratified with imposing majorities by the various Parliaments, the two 
Treaties came into force on January 1, 1958. The Commissions, which are the 
independent executives of  the two Communities, began functioning on January 
10, 1958. 
With the birth of the European Economic Community a new phase of the 
European revolution begins.  The six countries form a zone with a common 
economic policy, a zone which is also open to all the other countries of Europe 
wishing to join or associate themselves. The extension of  integration to the whole 
economy, currency excepted, commands and allows more daring solutions than 
those of the Coal and Steel Community. The free circulation of goods is to be 
made possible by the creation of a customs union, meaning the suppression of 
duties and quotas for trade between the member states and the establishment of  a 
common duty applicable to imports into all member states of  goods coming from 
outside. Freedom of  circulation of  goods within the common market is to apply 
to all products, other than coal and steel, which remain under the control of  the 
Coal and Steel Community, and products destined for nuclear installations which 
are controlled by the Euratom Treaty. The Economic Community will extend 
also to persons, investments and services, and is to be completed by the freedom 
to establish business. To ensure fair competition, common regulations are to be 
established and national legislation to be harmonized. 
Such advanced integration requires a common economic policy. The Treaty 
provides  for  such  policy  in commercial  relationS  with outside  countries.  It 
promotes it, either by outlining common objectives of social policy or of trans-
portation policy, or by providing permanent liaison groups between the member 
states as  for example in the fields of market or monetary policies. A European 
Investment Bank is to help in the development of less advanced regions of the 
Community and to encourage investments of  general interest. A European Social 
Fund is to come to the aid of unemployed labour. Taking into account the role 
played in the life of several member states by overseas countries and territories 
(mainly in Africa), with which they are especially linked, the Treaty associates 
these countries and territories with the Community. 
The E.E.C.  institutions,  like  those  of the E.C.S.C.,  reflect  the needs  of 
integration as  well as  the traditions of democracy. At the same time they are 
adapted to the broad tasks and to the decisions on economic policy which are 
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describe in the case of Euratom; in part they are  common to  the Economic 
Community, to Euratom and to the E.C.S.C. 
The accomplishment of integration, great in its economic daring as  well as 
in its political scope and human aspects, must be reached within twelve years, 
or fifteen years at the most; during the transition period, temporary deviations 
from the requirements of  integration are allowed subject to limited and precise 
conditions. 
Such is the general framework within which Euratom will function. The true 
meaning  of the  European atomic  effort  cannot be separated  from  the deep 
transformation of contemporary Europe. 
II.  NEGOTIATIONS  OF  THE  EURATOM  TREATY 
Among  the  countries  of Western  Europe,  only  Britain  and  to  a  lesser 
degree France, retarded by war and its economic aftermath, had undertaken an 
ambitious national programme of  nuclear energy development. These two nations 
were gradually realizing the scope of  the problems to be solved, whether they be 
concerned with the number of scientists or technicians, the volume of invest-
ments, or the vastness and complexity of  the needed industrial equipment. Their 
thoughts  on the  subject  largely  reflected  the  increasing  concern  of all  the 
countries of Western Europe over their energy  requirements,  as  a  result of 
constantly rising energy consumption. 
The first report on the energy problem was prepared on the initiative of  the 
O.E.E.C., by Louis Armand, then Chairman of  the French National Railroads, 
chosen  because  of his  extensive  technical  knowledge  and of his  exceptional 
capacity. The report he prepared for the O.E.E.C. was  published in June 1955 
under the title "Some Aspects of the European Energy Problem". This docu-
ment showed the increasing need for  energy in Europe and the necessity of 
making the best use of  energy resources. It described the immense potentialities 
of  nuclear energy, both as regards available quantities and as regards distribution 
facilities  and lower costs. It stressed, however, that more than any other, this 
form of  energy needed for its development close European co-operation especially 
for the exchange of  information and for the building and financing through joint 
effort, of nuclear industrial plants. 
The responsible governments were thus officially advised of the scope and 
promise of a common nuclear policy. They still had to be convinced that they 
should  consider  and give  effect  to  such  a  policy.  Their action,  within  the 
O.E.E.C., which was to lead in December 1957 to the creation of a "European 
Nuclear  Energy Agency",  is  described  elsewhere  in this  same  volume.  The 
present article can only trace the broad outlines of Euratom. 
An immediate consequence of the report presented by M. Armand to the 
O.E.E.C.  was  that he was  made  a  member of the French Delegation  and 
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Committee charged with applying the resolution adopted at Messina, in June 1955. 
The Messina  resolution  had recommended that "the creation of a  common 
organization be studied, such an organization to be entrusted with the responsi-
bility  and given  the means  of ensuring  the peaceful  development of atomic 
energy,  taking  into  consideration  the  special  arrangements  entered  into  by 
certain governments with outside parties". 
In November 1955, M. Armand presented the conclusions of  the Commission 
over which he presided. These conclusions were to be reproduced in substance, 
after completion or refinement, in the general report of  the Committee, adopted 
at Venice by the six Foreign Ministers, in May 1956. That report in turn was to 
serve as the basis for the Treaties. 
The agreement reached at this stage was  to prove definitive in most of its 
features. The scope of the effort to be undertaken was recognized. The need for 
new sources of  energy, much greater for Europe than for the United States, were 
emphasized.  The  potentially  revolutionary  consequences  of nuclear  energy 
justified a common effort on the part of  all public, private and mixed enterprises. 
It was necessary, said the report, "to create basic conditions so that industry as a 
whole and free  enterprise may play their essential part", and "to help in the 
formation and in the rapid growth of  a nuclear industry as well as in the nuclear 
development of  industries and of  economy as a whole". It was contemplated that 
the impulse supplied by Euratom would be felt in various fields: 
(a) It was to stimulate and co-ordinate scientific research, by acting directly in 
joint research and teaching, as well as by co-ordinating research pursued by the 
six countries in the nuclear field; 
(b) It was  to  further  the  exchange  and  the  pooling  of information  and 
of licences, either on a  mutually  agreeable  basis  or  through  compulsion  or 
arbitration, with the guarantee of  full compensation in all cases; 
(c) It was  to set up minimum standards for  the protection of health, and 
institute a control over installations; it was to require the preliminary communica-
tion of plans for  nuclear installations to which objections  might be made on 
grounds of safety; 
(d)  It was to publish programmes reflecting developments and it was to grant 
financial aid to installations, in order to guide investments without inhibiting the 
freedom of enterprises in such matters; 
(e) It was to take over, partially or even totally, common installations, keeping 
in mind the principle "that its task was to bring about investments on a public 
scale in so far as the initiatives or possibilities of  private industry, alone or in joint 
effort, seemed insufficient"; 
(f) It was  to set up a nuclear common market destined to help freedom of 
movement among the six countries of men, money, materials  and equipment 
needed for the development of nuclear energy; 
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ores and nuclear fuel, this equality having a bearing in fact on prices rather than 
on quantities, since there seems no likelihood of  scarcity. 
On all these points, the March 1957 Treaty was  not to stray far from the 
positions defined in the spring of 1956 in the general report adopted at Venice. 
However, two  questions, which had a  major political bearing, still remained 
unsolved: the possibility for member states to make, despite Euratom, military 
use of  atomic energy; the attribution to Euratom of  monopoly of the supply of 
nuclear materials and fuels, as well as the ownership of  special fissile materials. 
France was in favour of the first point, Germany was opposed to the second. In 
either case, decisions had to be made at the highest political level if  the negotia-
tions were to be successful. The determination of  men, strengthened by events, 
was to bring success. 
At the end of 1955, Jean Monnet organized "The Action Committee for 
the United States of  Europe" with the representatives of  the Socialists, Christian 
Democrat and Liberal parties, as well as of  the Lab9ur Unions, of  the six countries 
of the E.C.S.C. The Committee, meeting for the first time in January 1956, 
stated that "it was intended to ensure the unity of  action of  all the organizations 
belonging to it in order to realize, through successive concrete achievements, the 
United States of  Europe ....  Among the achievements which our Committee is 
determined  to see  succeed,  one-which must and  can  be the most rapid-
concerns atomic energy". 
In fact, while remaining vitally concerned with all other aspects of  European 
integration, the Committee used its influence over parliaments and public opinion 
to promote first of  all the success of  the Euratom negotiations. Its initial choice 
for the exclusively peaceful development of  nuclear energy contributed in France 
to a controversy between defenders and opponents of  the production of  national 
nuclear weapons. A parliamentary debate soon appeared necessary to throw light 
on the situation before negotiations could be resumed. The debate took place in 
the French National Assembly in mid-July 1956. The Assembly heard-a rather 
rare  event  in  French parliamentary  history-the technical  reports  of Louis 
Armand and Francis Perrin, High Commissioner to the Atomic Energy Com-
mission of France and a scientist of  great repute. It also heard the statements of 
Premier Guy Mollet and of his  ministers on the specific subject of reserving 
France's legal and practical capacity to produce nuclear weapons. The National 
Assembly thereupon took a stand on "Little Europe" for the first time since the 
E.D.C. fiasco, voted in favour of  the Euratom negotiations, 332 deputies for, 181 
opposed to the negotiations. 
The French parliamentary debate gave heart to all the negotiators. It also 
helped determine a point until then left open: Euratom, as  it stands, has an 
exclusively peaceful role. But, unless special agreements are concluded with an 
outside supplier, Euratom does  not forbid member states, under the condition 
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nuclear fuels, which then escape Euratom's control. As will be seen below, the 
point of escape from Euratom's control is carefully defined in the Treaty, and 
lQther international security controls begin where that of Euratom ends. 
A little after the settlement of this first question, the Suez affair underlined 
the urgency  of having  nuclear  energy  to  supplement  Europe's  conventional 
sources. Two consequences followed: 
Firstly, after the suggestion put forth by the Action Committee for the United 
States ofEurope, the six Foreign Ministers, in November 1957 a~ked  the "Three 
Wise  Men",  Louis  Armand,  Franz Etzel,  then Vice-President  of the  High 
Authority of the E.C.S.C. and Francesco Giordani, to present a report "on the 
quantities of  atomic energy which can be produced in the near future by the six 
countries, and on the means to be employed for this purpose". Presented to the 
Ministers in May 1957, this report was published under the title "A Target for 
Euratom". It recommended "the installation of a nuclear capacity of 15 million 
1W by the end of 1967, in order to stabilize our imports early in the 1960's". 
Secondly, negotiations on the Treaty received another impulse. While the 
:final drafting of  the texts was being undertaken, the Heads of  Governments them-
selves  were  applying their efforts  to remove the last obstacles.  The German 
Government, sharing the apprehensions voiced in Germany, in Belgium and in 
the Netherlands by big industry, strongly attached by tradition and principle to 
.a  climate of freedom,  had been from  the first  reluctant to accept the theses 
expounded by France. France, relying upon its own experience and upon that 
of  the United States and of  Great Britain, favoured strengthening the control of 
Euratom through the centralization of supplies  and the public ownership of 
:fissile  materials.  The negotiations  of the Treaty revealed that the agreement 
given to the report adopted at Venice was somewhat equivocal on these points. 
Yet the German Government, and with it all France's partners, accepted little 
by little, the need for a strong public organization to control the use of some 
of the most dangerous  materials.  In November  1956,  an interview  between 
Chancellor Adenauer and Premier Guy Mollet paved the way to an agreement of 
the Six  on the attribution to  a  supply Agency  of Euratom of a purchasing 
priority over ores and nuclear fuels produced or imported within the Community. 
At the end of  the negotiation, the six Heads of Governments meeting in Paris on 
February 19,  1957, to settle the remaining disagreements in the two  Treaties 
of the  Common Market  and  Euratom,  decided  that the latter  "would have 
ownership rights over all special fissile materials". 
From that moment, the treaty negotiation was a formality. The Treaty was 
soon ready to make its appearance as it did in the agreement already referred to, 
signed in Rome in March 1957. Ratification by all six Parliaments and deposit 
of the instruments of ratification took place as  shown in the Table below. 
As  has been seen, the Euratom Treaty came into force on January 1, 1958, 
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Date on which 
instruments 
Countries  Ratification  Majority  of ratifica-
date  tion were 
deposited 
BELGIUM2  -Chamber of Repre- Nov. 19, 57  174 a/4-2 abs.  Dec. 13, 1957 
sentatives 
-Senate  Nov. 28,57  134 c/2-2 abs. 
GERMANY2  -Bundestag  July 5, 57  No nominal vote  Dec. 9, 1957 
-Bundestag  July 19, 57  Unanimity 
FRANCE  -National Assembly  July 9, 57  332 a/240  Nov. 25, 1957 
-Council of the 
Republic  July 24, 57  216 cj80 
ITALY2  -Chamber of  July 30, 57  311 a/144- Nov. 23, 195T 
Deputies  54 abs. 
-Senate  Oct. 9, 57  No nominal vote 
LUXEMBOURG-Chamber of  Nov.  26,  57  46 a/3  Dec. 13, 1957 
Deputies 
NETHERLANDS-Second Chamber  Oct. 4, 57  No nominal vote  Dec. 13, 1957 
-First Chamber  Dec. 4, 57  Unanimity 
III.  THE  INSTITUTIONS  AND  AGENCIES  OF  EURATOM 
It would be impossible to describe clearly the functions and means of  action_ 
of Euratom without first describing its institutions. The institutions were dis--
cussed, their final shape formulated, and their powers defined, in the last two· 
months of  a two-year negotiation, and this was done keeping in mind the agree-
ment previously reached on proposed objectives and on initiatives to be under-
taken through joint effort. The adversities of  the E.D.C. had aroused in a great 
part of French public opinion a systematic opposition to any partial transfers of 
sovereignty  to  independent European bodies.  Deeply hostile  to  any  political 
European  federalism,  and  consequently  desirous  of inhibiting  anything  that 
might reinforce the first institutions of  Little Europe, these opponents wished to-
deprive Euratom of  institutions in common with the E.C.S.C., and in this respect,. 
they had been reassured by French Foreign Minister Pineau, in the course of the-
July 1956 debate before the French National Assembly. 
Thus the institutions of Euratom were not set up with the view of uniting 
Europe politically, but rather to protect, in the field of nuclear energy, certain 
common  indispensable  objectives.  Nevertheless,  these  institutions  could  not 
escape the general design already imposed upon the E.C.S.C. by the combined 
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opposition, the diplomatic instruments signed in Rome and ratified with nearly a 
100 vote majority by the French Parliament in 1957, finally accept, for obvious 
motives of political coherence and administrative economy, certain institutions 
common to the three European communities, the Economic Community, the 
E.C.S.C. and Euratom. 
Dispositions  governing  the  Euratom  institutions  are  contained in several 
texts, which have been ratified as a whole by each of  the six national parliaments. 
Along with the Euratom Treaty, whose Chapter III is concerned with institu-
tional provisions, the six governments also  signed at Rome in March 1957,  a 
Convention on certain institutions to be common to all European Communities. 
Furthermore,  the governments  signed at Brussels, in April of the same year, 
a  protocol  on the Privileges  and  Immunities of Euratom,  and a protocol on 
the status of the Court of Justice.  It is  to the whole of these documents that 
one must refer in order to examine the organization and powers of the Euratom 
institutions. 
The European Atomic Energy Community is an organization with a mission 
to reach common objectives. Each member country puts at the disposal of this 
organization  the  necessary  means  of action.  Material means,  of course,  but 
specially the legal means which are the necessary mark of public authority: the 
power of direction over the nationals of the Community. It is  this transfer of 
their own powers to a common organization,  agreed to by the member states, 
which is the fundamental characteristic of Euratom, and of the other European 
Communities. 
Common institutions are necessary in order to  exercise full  authority and 
receive  the  transferred  powers  according  to  a  system  acceptable  to  Western 
democratic ideas. These institutions consist of two executive institutions which 
are called  to  collaborate closely-the Commission  and the Council; and two 
institutions of control-the Assembly and the Court of Justice. In addition, the 
Economic  and  Social  Committee  provides  for  a representation  of all  types 
of professional interests before  the executive  institutions.  We  turn now  to  a 
separate description of each of these institutions.  They are  so  related to  one 
another, however, that none can be described adequately without reference to 
others. 
1.  The Commission 
Of the two executive Institutions, the Commission3  is  the most original in 
concept.  A  permanent  body,  exclusively  devoted  to  the  realization  of the 
missions of the Community, the Commission is to be the constant expression of 
single  general  interest  of the  Community.  The  Commission's  authority  is 
dependent upon the confidence it inspires. Friendly to all, it must not extend 
favours  to any. To this end, two  traits mark its status: it is  a body, and it is 
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Since the decisions of the Commission are to be taken by a majority of the 
members composing it, the number of these members must be uneven.  The 
E.E.C. Commission and the E.C.S.C. High Authority number nine members 
each. However, it appeared that a smaller group would be best designed to serve 
the interests of the highly specialized Euratom and to facilitate the making of 
prompt decisions.  Furthermore, Luxembourg, with a population of but three 
hundred thousand, not having the means of devoting a very important effort to 
the development of nuclear energy, agreed not to claim  a seat for  one of its 
nationals in the Euratom Commission. Following this action by Luxembourg it 
was decided to have a Commission composed of  five members, each coming from 
a different member state.  This number can be changed by a unanimous decision 
of the Council.  The Council, which we  shall come to presently, may  also  by 
unanimous  vote  agree  to  the  government  of a  member state appointing an 
accredited representative to serve as permanent liaison with the Commission. A 
qualified  representative  of the  Government of Luxembourg  is  accredited  in 
application of this clause. 
The exercise of the powers granted the Commission by the Treaty is to be 
debated by its members as a body. The Commission drafts its own rules of  pro-
cedure, which are to be published. Thus it sets the quorum for meetings, a figure 
which obviously cannot be less than three, since that is the required majority for 
the adoption of  decisions. Being the collective holder of  the authority granted to 
it by the Treaty, the Commission is also responsible as a collective unit for its 
action. Before public opinion as well as in its debates with the other institutions 
of the  Community,  the  Commission  constitutes  an  indivisible  entity. If  the 
Assembly emits  a vote  of censure against  the Commission, the latter resigns 
collectively. Minority opinions are never to be published, nor are the conditions 
under which votes actually take place in the Commission. Only the conclusions_ 
of  the deliberations are to be made public, never the manner in which they took 
place. This regulation is indispensable, in order to leave a real freedom to each of 
its members in debates and in votes. 
T4_e members of  the Commission, because they are closely united, can more 
easily  discharge  their duty  to  be independent from  outside  influences.  High 
priests of  the Community, they are to devote themselves exclusively to the realiza-
tion of  the great hope the people have placed in them. Their personal status will 
bear the stamp of this preoccupation. Each member is appointed by agreement 
among  the  governments  of the  member  states.  He  does  not  represent  the 
country of which he is a national. Appointed for a four-year period, which can 
be renewed, the members of  the Commission cannot be recalled by the govern-
ments. All the governments can do is to suspend a member temporarily from his 
functions, pending the decision of the Court of Justice. The Court of Justice is 
the only one authorized to remove a member from office if he no longer fulfils 
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offence. Each member makes a solemn promise that both during and after his 
term in office, he will respect the obligations of  his office. In particular, he is not 
to ask  nor to accept  instructions  from  any  government or other body.  As  a 
corollary each member state promises not to seek to influence the members of 
the  Commission  in the  performance  of their  duty.  The Commission  has  a 
President and a Vice-President, selected from among its members (for a renew-
able period of two years) by the governments of all the member states. Primus 
inter pares,  the President is  not endowed by the Treaty with specific powers. 
His position of President, however, does  give him a co-ordinating power and 
offers him an opportunity to exert a personal and practical influence over the 
other members. 
To inform it and to support its action, the Commission has a permanent 
administration  with services  regulated by the Commission  itself.  The Com-
mission  can request any advice  or call upon any study committees it deems 
necessary to the fulfilment of its mission. The Treaty itself provides the Com-
mission with a Scientific and Technical Committee, of  advisory status, composed 
of  twenty members appointed individually by the Council, after consultation of 
the Commission. The Commission seeks the advice of  this Committee each time 
it considers it desirable.  The Committee must also  be consulted in all  cases 
prescribed in the Treaty. 
2.  The Council 
The Council's organization" applies to Euratom a formula commonly used 
in international organizations. The Council is  composed of representatives of 
the member states, each government appointing to it one of its members; this 
member may change according to matters involved. Presidency is rotated, each 
member of the Council holding the office  for  six  months.  The Council thus 
become a political forum where open exchanges of  views can take place between 
the competent members of the government on the various problems facing the 
Community. The value and influence of this institution will depend largely on 
the frequency of  and attitude displayed in contacts among men who are charged 
with political responsibility and who may obtain decisions on the national level. 
The political debates  within the Council will  fulfil  its  essential  function.  In 
preparation for  these debates,  co-ordinated technical studies  are  to  be  made 
by each national administration. The Council  can set  up a committee, whose 
authority and mission are to be defined by the Council, with a view to assuring 
that such co-ordinated technical studies are made. 
Of  classical structure, the Council is less classical in its voting procedures, as a 
result of  the transfers of  sovereignties and of  powers to the Community. Being a 
truly Community organization, and not simply an organization where states 
meet while retaining their sovereignty, the Council, like the Commission, has the 
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the territories of  the Community. For the adoption of  resolutions, majority voting 
is the rule, unanimity the exception. To counteract the weakness which might 
result from the indifference or from  the international neutrality of a member 
state, an abstention will not prevent the adoption of  the rare Council decisions 
requiring unanimity.  Majority is generally calculated according to number of 
members composing the Council: the agreement of any four of  the six member 
states  is  usually  enough  to  make  a  decision  final.  But the most  important 
decisions to be taken by the Council require a prescribed majority, with weighted 
votes.  Save for some financial decisions, where special weighted votes are pro-
vided, the prescribed majority has the effect of preventing any decision of the 
Council being taken either against the advice of  two of  the three larger countries: 
Germany, France or Italy, or against the advice of  the three Benelux countries, 
unless,  in this  latter  case,  the decision  is  proposed  to  the  Council  by the 
Commission. 
These different voting procedures throw light on what has been done to avoid 
two of  the main pitfalls usually found in international organizations: inefficiency 
resulting from a prescribed unanimous vote; partisan coalition made possible by 
a simple majority. Although no basic rule has been set, it can be said briefly that 
in the Euratom Council, decisions  pertaining to  the current operation of the 
Community are to be taken by a simple majority vote; decisions involving con-
siderable political implications, by a prescribed majority; unanimity is reserved 
for those few decisions destined to amend the Treaty or implying an extension of 
the commitments already undertaken by the member states, in which case each 
member state has the right of veto. 
3.  Relationship of Commission and Council 
In their organization as well as in their method of  operation, the two executive 
institutions are adapted to the exercise of  the community powers given to them. 
The practical distribution between them of  the authority and powers transferred 
to Euratom by the member states will be described in the course of the study of 
the missions assigned the Community. It is  necessary to emphasize, however, 
that apart from exercising those special powers that belong to it alone, the Com-
mission associates itself with almost all the deliberations of the Council, save, 
naturally, those  bearing on decisions  concerning the internal structure of the 
Council. This association presents two distinct aspects. 
First, the Commission is consulted by the Council before the latter takes a 
stand. This preliminary consultation, always possible upon the initiative of the 
·Council, is sometimes made obligatory by the Treaty, for example in the case of 
·some appointments or in budgetary matters. 
Secondly, and this is the case in a great number of important decisions, the 
Council cannot take a stand except upon a proposal of the Commission. If the 
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the Council, it is  not adopted.  The Commission must then present anothet 
proposal. If  no agreement can be reached on its first proposal the Commission 
must then amend its own proposal which, whilst taking in account debates before 
the Council, may gather the required majority. The Council can always, when 
unanimous, modify the Commission's proposal. The Council can adopt, with a 
majority vote, only the proposal presented by the Commission-when such a 
majority, plain or prescribed is sufficient according to the Treaty. As a result of 
these rules each member state recovers its right of veto when the Commission, 
which is but the expression of  the general interest of the Community, is in dis-
agreement with the majority of the Council. A majority formed by a partisan 
coalition is no longer sufficient to force a decision. And the obligation of  obtaining 
on all important matters either the unanimity of the Council, or the agreement 
of  the Commission and the required majority before the Council, brings about a 
permanent give-and-take between the Commission and the Council. 
Close co-operation is therefore essential between the Council and the Com-
mission. The fact that members of  the national governments on the one hand and 
members of the Commission on the other are thus working together is the best 
guarantee of understanding and of efficiency. 
*  *  *  *  * 
The Commission and Council of  Euratom are particular to this Community 
although similar in power and responsibility to corresponding institutions of  the 
European Economic Community. Those of  the Coal-Steel Community are rather 
different. 
On the other hand, the Court of Justice and the Assembly are one and the 
same for  all  the three Communities. 
5  These single institutions have a  plural 
charter. In the exercise of  their powers and authority, the single Assembly and 
the single Court of  Justice apply to each Community the provisions of  the Treaty 
dealing with that particular Community. The provisions governing the composi-
tion and organization of the single Assembly and single Court of Justice must 
therefore  be  identical.  This  requirement  having  been  met by  aligning  the 
provisions of  the three Treaties on these points, the Assembly and the Court of 
Justice, both unchangeable in their structure, no matter what Community they 
deal with, exercise their powers and authority in the field of  Euratom, exclusively 
according to the provisions of  the Euratom Treaty. 
4.  The Assembly 
The Assembly6  is  the parliamentary institution of the Communities.  Its 
members represent peoples and not governments. A witness and a guarantee of 
political democracy in an integrated Europe, it may become the most active agent 
of  a genuine federalism. The provisions dealing with it are inspired by the wish 
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room to influence the life of the Community toward the concept of European 
political unity. 
The Assembly is now composed of 142 delegates appointed by the national 
Parliaments from among their own members. Each one of  the three large member 
states-Germany, France and Italy-has 36 delegates; Belgium and the Nether-
lands have 14 each, and Luxembourg has six. The total number of seats as well 
as  their distribution (which takes into account the size of populations and the 
strength of economic forces) is the same as that for the consultative Assembly of 
the Council of Europe. An attempt has  thus been made to facilitate  a future 
grouping of  all the European Assemblies, around an unchangeable parliamentary 
nucleus, common to the Europe of the Six and to all other European organiza-
tions. But apart from this method of indirect appointment, now in practice, the 
Treaty provides that the Assembly will draw up proposals for election by direct 
universal suffrage, according to an identical procedure in all the member states. 
The possibility of  a political evolution is thereby recognized. However, the rights 
of national governments  are  also protected: the Assembly  simply  drafts  pro-
posals. The Council can only recommend those proposals that are voted unani-
mously.  Only the final  agreement of the member states  can bring about an 
effective reform of the Assembly. 
The rules of procedure of the Assembly are based on usual parliamentary 
practice. Each year, the Assembly appoints its President and its officers; it sets 
its own rules of  procedure. It holds at least one annual meeting and can also hold 
extraordinary sessions, either on its own initiative, or at the request of  the Council 
or of the Commission.  Except where otherwise  provided  in the Treaty, the 
Assembly takes its decisions by an absolute majority of votes cast. 
The Assembly's first task-the basic function of  all parliaments-is to super-
vise  the  Executive.  The Commission  is  held  politically  responsible  for  its 
administration before the Assembly. It must answer questions addressed to it. 
The Commission may attend all meetings of the Assembly and be heard by it. 
The Commission  presents  an  annual  general  report on the activities  of the 
Community to the Assembly, which then discusses it in a public meeting. The 
Assembly's right to censure the Commission is a guarantee that the Commission 
will be politically responsible; this guarantee is indispensable if  the Assembly is 
to exercise an effective influence. As  indicated earlier in discussing the Com-
mission, if  such a motion of  censure is adopted-by a two-third majority of  votes 
cast, representing a majority of  the members of  the Assembly-the members of 
the Commission must tender their resignation collectively. 
The right of  censure exercised by the Assembly also exists in the case of  the 
Coal-Steel Community, although it is subject to more strict regulations than in 
Euratom. Experience has proved that the existence of  this provision allowed the 
creation of a  virtually permanent and unlimited regime of  parliamentary control 
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This development  of parliamentary practice is  most  encouraging  for  the 
future; as regards the Commission, it underlines even more the anomaly resulting 
from the absence of any control of  the Assembly over the Council which wields 
the power of decision in the most important matters in the name of the Com-
munity. Not only does  the Council escape the censure of the Assembly,  but 
according to  the Treaty it has  the right to  be heard by the Assembly  under 
conditions laid down by itself in its own rules of procedure. 
A supervisory institution first, the Assembly also takes part in the drafting of 
the rules of the Community. The Assembly's role in Euratom in this respect is 
much greater than in the E.C.S.C., where the Assembly is much more circum-
scribed. However, it is  true that the Assembly, as  it now stands, has a purely 
advisory role. Its advice is to be sought before important decisions can be taken 
by the Council, but by itself it can take no decision, even as  regards its own 
budget. In other words, the Assembly has no legislative power. 
5.  The Court of  Justice 
The existence of a Court of Justice
7  common to the European Communities 
shows  again  that these  Communities  have  borrowed much from  the federal 
machinery. The definition of  the limits of the authority and powers transferred 
by the member states to the Communities,  the jurisdictional control over acts 
performed by the common institutions, the gradual interpretation of  the rules of 
law in relation to common objectives-such are the missions which, far removed 
from the traditional mission of  international courts, inevitably recall those func-
tions proper to sovereign tribunals acting in matters pertaining to public law. 
The Court's functions remind one of those of the Constitutional Courts of 
Germany and Italy, and the Councils of State of France, Belgium,  July and 
Luxembourg.  These functions  go  even  further  and suggest  those  of federal 
supreme  courts.  They  involve-and  no  one  found  this  surprising  for  the 
E.C.S.C., nor for the two new Communities-the institution of a special Court 
of Justice whcse authority extends to the whole Community, and which shares 
with  the  Ccmmission,  the  Council  and the  Assembly,  the responsibility  of 
defining a ccmmon rule of law  in relation to  common objeccives,  and seeing 
that it is enforced. 
The Court of Justice, the same for all three Communities, is  composed of 
seven judges assisted by two advocates-general.  These magistrates are chosen 
among jurists of  recognized impartiality and qualifications. Their number can be 
increased by unanimous vote of the Council and at the request of the Court of 
Justice.  Judges and  advocates-general are  appointed  for  a  term of six  years 
renewable by common agreement of the governments of member states.  The 
judges elect the President of  the Court of  Justice from among their own number, 
for a three-year term, which is renewable. However, its first President is named 
for  three years  by the governments of member states.  8  The Court can  sit in 159  EURATOM 
plenary session.  It may  also  set up divisions,  each composed of three to five 
judges, in order to conduct certain enquiries or to judge certain categories of 
cases in accordance with rule prescribed by the Court for these purposes. 
Each case submitted must produce first written reports in behalf of all sides 
of the case, then an oral presentation. The Court can question the parties and 
conduct any enquiry it deems  necessary.  In each case,  one of the advocates-
general must publicly present, after the close of  oral hearing marking the end of 
the public proceeding, his views which are to assist the Court in its mission. The 
Court adopts its own rules of  procedure, within the limits of  its statute, and sub-
mits  them for  the  unanimous  approval  of the  Council.  It appoints  its  own 
registrar and personnel. 
The Court is intended to ensure observance of the rules of law in the inter-
pretation and application of  the Treaty. To this end, the Court has several areas 
of jurisdiction. It is to take note of violations of the Treaty by member states; 
these are then bound to  adopt all  measures  necessary to execute the Court's 
orders. Alleged violation can be brought before the Court either by the Com-
mission or by a member state, but in both cases  the Commission must have 
previously drawn up a reasoned opinion regarding the alleged violation and given 
the opportunity to the accused member state to present its observations. 
The Court also  exercises a control over the legality of acts  of the executive 
institutions. Their acts, or failure to act, can be the object of  appeals lodged either 
by the member states or by the other institutions of the Community. The right 
to appeal for an annulment has been granted only in a small number of cases to 
other entities even if they have a strong interest in the issue. This is regrettable 
because in the case of decisions taken by the common institutions it offers no 
legal protection such as the parties concerned might have if  these same decisions 
were taken by national insitutions. It is all the more difficult to explain, since any 
party concerned can at any time invoke the jurisdiction of the Court to avoid 
enforcement of a questionable action of the Commission or Council. To avoid 
a  paralysis  of the  executive  institutions,  legal  appeals  directed  against  their 
decisions do not have a staying effect. This rule, however, is moderated by the 
power of  the Court, if  it feels circumstances so require, to order suspension of  the 
execution of the decision under attack. 
The Court, throughout the Community, is  also  competent to bring about 
uniformity in law not only by deciding upon the validity of  actions of  the common 
institutions  but also  by  interpreting  the Treaty in relation  to  such  actions. 
National judicial tribunals can appeal to the Court of Justice on these issues, if 
they consider there is a need to do so; they must, in fact, do so if such issue is 
raised in a case being heard by a national tribunal from whose decisions no aopeal 
lies under the national law. Finally, the Court of  Justice has been made competent 
in certain special  cases:  it can hear,  sometimes  of necessity,  sometimes  after 
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the application of the Treaty or connected with the objectives pursued by the 
Treaty. 
Decisions  rendered by the Court of Justice affecting the Coal  and Steel 
Community  during  recent  years  have  demonstrated  the  importance  of the 
Court's contribution to the gradual building of  a Community and to the accom-
.  plishment of  its mission. The public views of the advocates-general, which are a 
complete commentary on each case, compensate, theoretically, for the absence of 
publication of  the dissenting minority opinions, such a publication being for the 
moment difficult to reconcile with the judicial practices of  the six countries. The 
fact that the Court is not competent to give opinions before a case actually arises., 
protects it from the executive branches which might be tempted to hide behind 
the Court's authority in the exercise of  their own responsibilities. The Court is 
all the more free to set the scope of  the rule of  law as it applies to concrete cases 
brought to its attention. 
6.  The Economic and Social Committee 9 
This Committee is not a common institution. Its function is purely advisory; 
it exercises none of  the powers transferred to the Community. However, it serves 
both the European  Economic  Community and Euratom.  Composed of 101 
members chosen from representatives of  various sections of  economic and social 
life, it is appointed by the unanimous vote of  the Council, after consultation with 
the Commission, the states and European professional organizations; it is sub-
divided into several specialized sections, and particularly a specialized section in 
those fields pertaining to Euratom. This Committee is consulted by the Executive 
institutions as  they deem necessary. It must be consulted in certain cases for 
. which  provision  is  made in the Treaty.  The Committee thus  provides  the 
executive institutions of Euratom with  a  liaison  with the various  social  and 
economic interests,  and especially  with trade and labour  unions,  whose  co-
operation is indispensable for the development of a nuclear industry. 
IV.  EURATOM'S  MEANS  OF  ACTION 
All the means of action, legal, administrative or financial, bear the mark of, 
and are limited by, the gradual integration of  countries deeply divided for a very 
long time. Despite existing frontiers, these countries are striving to bring about 
the construction of  a Community law and the achievement of  Community action. 
1.  Legal Means 
Two essential means of  legal action have been put in Euratom's hands. 
In order to achieve their purposes and under the conditions laid down in the 
Treaty, the executive institutions may issue mandatory orders.10 Independently 
of all recommendations and opinions which have no binding force but give the 
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tive institutions issue regulations and directives  and take  decisions  under the 
conditions laid down in the Treaty. Regulations, which have a general scope, and 
decisions which apply to a named addressee, are directly applicable without the 
intervention of any national body; they can bind member states, enterprises or 
any other entity. Directives are addressed to a member state imposing upon it  the 
obligations of achieving certain results, but they leave the national authorities 
free to choose the means. Regulations, directives and decisions are mandatory, in 
all the territories of the Community.  They must be supported by reasonable 
explanations and published in the Official Journal of the Community, or be the 
subject of direct notification. When necessary, execution of the decisions of  the 
Commission, or of the judgments of the Court of  Justice, is assured according to 
national procedure, after  the  State involved has  appended its  decree for  the 
enforcement of these decisions. This appending is a formality which allows the 
national authority to do nothing more than verify the authenticity of  the proceed-
ings emanating from the common institutions. 
Euratom is also endowed with a legal personality.  11 This means that in each 
member state it is  accorded  the same  capacity  granted  to  legal  persons  by 
national  laws.  Having  rights  and  duties,  and  owning  property,  Euratom  is 
naturally subject to national laws  in each member state. Important exceptions, 
however, deserve mention: a protocol on privileges and immunities extends to 
Euratom the prerogatives  and fiscal  exemptions  usually  granted international 
organizations. The property of Euratom cannot be the object of  any compulsory 
measure without authorization by the Court of  Justice. The contractual responsi-
bility of the Community is governed, according to custom, by contract law. But 
the Treaty provides in the case of non-contractual responsibility a rule which 
will take on meaning as the Court of Justice develops experience in applying it. 
Simply stated, the rule is  that the Community must, in conformity with the 
general principles common to the laws of the members, make good any damage 
caused by its institutions or by its agents in the discharge of their duties. 
2.  Administrative Means of Action12 
The administrative means given Euratom cannot be fully effective from the 
beginning. The choice  of headquarters, for  example,  requires  the unanimous 
agreement of the governments of the members; linked to the overall problem of 
implementation of the European communities, it has  not found an immediate 
solution, and work will start under precarious and complicated conditions, which 
may hinder the organization's efficiency. The coexistence of  four different langu-
ages within the community creates a heavily handicapped linguistic regime which 
only the unanimous  Council can remedy, through measures that could not be 
easily taken at this stage of  European integration. Since the status of  the agents of 
the Community is  to  be fixed  by unanimous decision of the Council, the first 
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Euratom's services  will  be fully  attained only at the conclusion of its  ~tial 
phase. But the Treaty has provided the necessary bases for the gradual establish-
ment of  an effective administration. 
The Euratom Commission enjoys the right to seek information and to verify 
it, as far as is necessary, for the accomplishment of its mission, and within the 
limits and under the conditions set forth by the Council. As a counterpart, access 
to information protected by secrecy is strictly regulated. The violation of  secrecy 
is to be prosecuted throughout the Community like a breach of  national security 
or the disclosure of professional secrets. 
3.  Financial Means of Action 
Detailed  provisions  of the  Treaty  govern  Euratom's  financial  means  9f 
action.13 These provisions establish two budgets: the administrative budget and 
the research and investment budget. The latter is to be based on programmes 
extending over several years. Both budgets, drafted provisionally by the institu-
tions of  the Community, each acting for its own account, then combined by the 
Commission, are to be finally adopted by the Council, voting with the prescribed 
majority, after consultation with the Assembly. Financing is to be accomplished 
in the main by contributions made  by the states, according to a sliding scale. 
However, the financial contributions of  members may eventually be replaced by 
the yield of taxes collected by the Community in member states.  To this end, 
the Commission is to submit proposals to the Council, which by a unanimous 
decision after consultation with the Assembly, is to draw up provisions which it 
will recommend member states to adopt. Euratom can also  raise  loans  under 
conditions  set by the Council (voting by a prescribed majority),  in order to 
:finance research and investments. 
V.  THE  AIMS  OF  EURATOM 
"It shall be the aim of the Community [says  Article  I  of the Treaty]  to 
contribute to the raising of the standard of living in member states and to the 
development of commercial  exchanges  with  other  countries  by the creation 
()f conditions  necessary  for  the  speedy  establishment and growth of nuclear 
industries." 
This preamble shows the close liaison of Euratom with the E.C.S.C. and the 
Economic Community. The creation and development of  a nuclear industry are 
means which, along with others, are to serve the interests of  the social progress 
()f the members and to strengthen world solidarity. Undoubtedly, the thought 
behind the creation of a powerful nuclear industry was that, through it, Europe 
would  not  only  acquire  independent  sources  of  energy  but  could  also 
come  increasingly  to  the  help  of under-developed  countries.  Moreover,  as 
indicated earlier, the authority of Euratom extends not only to the European 
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member  state  is  responsible  but  also  to  the  non-European  territories 
within their  jurisdiction,  among  which  are  French Mrica and  the  Belgian 
Congo.14 
In pursuance of the Treaty provisions, Euratom is to accomplish its missioo 
by pursuing actions in  several fundamental domains: research, industrial develop-
ment, public health and safety, supplies of materials for the Community, and 
foreign policy. 
1.  Research 
Euratom is  to  promote  the  development  of research15  in  those  fields 
most  closely  linked  to  the  development  of  a  nuclear  industry.  A  first 
selection  is  affixed  as  an  annex  to  the  Treaty;  it can  be amended by the 
Council. 
The Commission, while refraining from coercion, is expected to orient the 
research undertaken by the member states, so as to discourage wasteful duplica-
tion and fill any gaps. To this end, it may ask member states to advise Euratom 
of  their research programmes and Euratom may express opinions about them to 
the states. It may call together research specialist'3 for discussion and exchange of 
views. It is to publish periodically a list showing the areas of  research it considers 
inadequately studied. In order to encourage the implementation of a research 
programme, it may furnish financial aid or material support: plants, equipment 
or experts. 
Euratom may also act directly by training specialists and organizing research. 
The Commission is to set up a Community Nuclear Research Centre, which will 
carry out the tasks entrusted to it by the Commission. Within the framework of 
the Centre, the Commission can set up schools  for training specialists, after 
consulting the Economic and Social Committee. An institution is to be created at 
the university level. Finally, Euratom is to be responsible for common training 
and research programmes. These programmes, to cover periods not exceeding 
five years, are to be drawn up by the Council, voting unanimously, on a proposal 
submitted by the Commission. The execution of  Euratom's programmes is to be 
entrusted to either the Community Research  Centre, the states, international 
organizations,  firms  or individuals,  in  accordance  with  contracts  concluded 
between them and the Commission.  Euratom is  to publish its research pro-
grammes and periodical progress reports on their execution. An initial research 
and teaching programme of  215 million dollars, to be carried out before January 1, 
1963, is provided for in an annex to the Treaty.16 
This method of  action, as adopted by Euratom, should prove effective, while 
being fully  respectful of the free initiative of private enterprise. It envisions 
complementing public and private efforts within the member states  with the 
execution by Euratom of a programme pertaining to equipment, training and 
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2.  Industrial Development 
Initiative concerning industrial equipment is  inspired by  much the same 
intention. Euratom will endeavour to create the most favourable climate for the 
development  of nuclear  industries,  taking  into  account  the  decisions  freely 
arrived at by either private or public enterprises, who will be kept fully informed 
by Euratom. The institution of a nuclear common market, organized dissemina-
tion of  knowledge, and study of  investment programmes, all contribute to reach-
ing this objective. Complementary industrial equipment can be obtained through 
Euratom, thanks to the setting up of  Community enterprises. Hand-in-hand with 
the industrial development, the establishment of  an appropriate control must be· 
assured for safeguarding public health. 
(a)  The  nuclear  common  market17- This  can  be considered  as  a  preview,. 
simplified in form and limited to the fields directly concerning nuclear industry,. 
of the system which at the end of a provisional twelve to fifteen year period, is. 
intended to guarantee the free movement of  goods and persons within the com-
mon market of the European Economic  Community.  From January  1,  1959, 
customs barriers between member states are  to be abolished on all goods and 
products mentioned on the lists attached to the Euratom Treaty, subject in some 
cases  to the proof of a nuclear purpose.  From the same date, customs duties 
common to all  member states  are  to be applicable to  imports  from  outside· 
countries on most goods and products. No restriction based on nationality may 
be applied by the Community to individuals of member states, seeking either 
specialized employment in the nuclear field, or participation in the construction 
of nuclear  plants  being  built for  scientific  or industrial purposes.  Necessary 
measures will be taken to facilitate the conclusion of  insurance contracts against 
atomic risks. Currency restrictions between the member states will be abolished 
in a manner commensurate with the freedom of movement extended to goods, 
services, capital and persons. 
These measures, which are intended to facilitate the pooling of the human 
and material resources of  the Community, are for the most part left in the hands 
of  the member states. In matters pertaining to customs  duties, these states are 
bound to respect a certain calendar. In other fields, they are subjected to pressure 
to be exerted by Euratom. At times, the Commission may send recommendations 
to the member states or otherwise make sure that they fulfil  their obligations. 
At other times, the Council, voting with a prescribed majority on a proposal set 
forth by the Commission, after seeking the opinion of the Assembly and the 
Economic and Social Council, may address to the member states directives which 
firmly commit them to reach certain objectives. 
(b) Information  and patents-In order rapidly to develop  a strong nuclear 
industry, the common market must have access to all information, classified or 
not. Euratom sets up in member states an ambitious programme bearing on the 
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character of  national patent systems in force in the states of the Community. In 
Germany and in the Netherlands, provisional licences or patents are delivered 
only after a period of  several years has expired during which time the scientific 
value of a discovery can be verified. In the territory of other members, patents 
are  delivered  in  a  few  months,  by  simply  registering  requests,  without any 
guarantee as to the value or the authenticity of the discovery, which is open to 
question  before  law-courts  at  any  time.  Since  a  choice  between  these  two 
systems is now the object of  a world-wide discussion, Euratom has not been able 
to rally the member states to a  common system.  Therefore,  the  community 
allows for both types of national legislation so that the patent system may be 
applied according to each. 
The pooling of information at the disposal of Euratom does not give rise to 
any basic difficulty. The Commission can grant licences or sub-licences for pro-
tected claims it owns, or such licences that may be .at its disposal, with appropriate 
compensation and under conditions which, if  not mutually agreed to, can be 
determined by the Court of Justice. The Commission communicates also at the 
request of members any information not protected by licences, patents or the 
like which it may have acquired. 
Dissemination throughout the Community of information which is not its 
exclusive property must also be assured in so far  as  it helps achieve  common 
objectives. Owing to the need for careful organization, the system adopted pur-
sues several aims. It must allow within the Community a direction of  research as 
well as a sufficient degree of  application of  discoveries, both of  which are needed 
for the development of nuclear energy. To this end, the Commission is entitled 
to be notified of  all information for which some form of  protection is applied for 
in a member state, whether it relates to a nuclear matter or to a matter which, 
without being nuclear, is directly linked to the development of nuclear energy 
within the Community. No agreement with an outside state implying participa-
tion  of a  fully  sovereign state can be concluded without the authorization or 
participation  of the  Commission, if its  purpose  is  to  exchange  scientific  or 
industrial information on nuclear matters. 
Recourse to compulsory procedures can be made only after failure to reach a 
mutually acceptable settlement among the parties concerned. The Commission 
is  to encourage, organize and promote amicable exchanges.  In the absence of 
agreed settlement, the Commission can, within specific limits and under carefully 
determined conditions, force  the granting of licences  when these licences  are 
necessary either to the pursuit of common research programmes or to the satis-
factory development of nuclear energy in the Community. Upon being notified 
of  the Commission's intention, patent owners can reach a special agreement for 
the purpose of  submitting the matter to an Arbitration Committee. The arbitra-
tion body then takes a decision on the granting of the licence and sets the con-
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the compulsory licensing by the member state that is competent,  according to its 
own national legislation. 
But,  compulsory  measures  made  necessary  for  the  protection  of the 
Community's  interest  must  not  damage  the  interests  of the  owners  of the 
patents. 
As regards the information it has acquired, the Commission can use it for its 
own information with due regard to the rights of  others. The granting of  licences 
through arbitration or compulsion  is  to be made with full  compensation.  If 
damages are inflicted, they must be compensated.  Finally, security regulations 
· have been provided for so as to allow the communication of  information within 
the Community and use of it without jeopardizing the defence interests of a 
member state. 
(c)  Investment advice-With the help of the new facilities and greater means 
provided by the common nuclear market and the dissemination of information, 
private  or public firms  will  be  able  to  increase  their  effort  to  develop  their 
industrial nuclear equipment. To encourage them, Euratom is to give advice on 
investments.19 Periodically, the Commission is to publish programmes indicating 
objectives for the production of atomic energy and the various types of invest-
ment required for  the realization of those objectives.  These objectives  can be 
more easily determined since the High Authority of the :a. C. S.C. has  recently 
been made  responsible for  the study and drafting of all proposals destined to 
facilitate  a co-ordinated policy as  regards  energy matters in the six countries. 
Furthermore, prior to their execution, the Commission must be notified of all 
investment plans in the field of  nuclear industry and the Commission is required 
to discuss  them with the persons  or firms  concerned,  communicate its  views 
thereon to the member state concerned, and as  the case  may  be, publish such 
plans with the agreement of all concerned. 
(d) Joint enterprises-It may happen that private initiative is not able to supply 
in sufficient quantity and at the required speed all the needs of industrial equip-
ment within the Community. Euratom can help by conferring the status of joint 
enterprise20 to those undertakings of  outstanding importance to the development 
of  nuclear industry in the Community. Any member state, any person, can-like 
the Commission-make plans for the establishment of a joint enterprise. The 
Commission is required to conduct an enquiry on each plan, seek all the opinions 
it deems necessary, and submit proposals for joint enterprises to the Council. If 
the Council, by a prescribed majority, approves the proposal, the joint enterprise 
achieves a status which brings  various  advantages.  Each joint enterprise, thus 
approved,  is  a legal  person with the widest  recognized  rights  in each  of the 
member states. The Council, voting unanimously, can also extend to these joint 
enterprises  in the member states  various  rights  such  as  the right  to  acquire 
movable and immovable property and patents, the right to be exempted from 
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Council  can  even  decide  that  Euratom,  an  international  organization,  or  a 
national or a  state outside the Community, may  participate in the financing 
of  a joint enterprise. 
3.  Health and Safety 
The development of  nuclear industry must not endanger public health. The· 
Euratom institutions can influence in important ways  the efforts  pursued by 
member states in order to establish basic standards for  the protection of the 
health of the workers and of the general population against the dangers arising. 
from  ionizing radiation.  21  Mter consulting experts,  the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Assembly, the Council, on the proposal of  the Commission~ 
voting by the prescribed majority, is to determine for the whole of the Com-
munity the maximum doses  as  well  as  the maximum  permissible  degree of 
contamination and of  exposure, and the principles governing the medical super-
vision of  workers. Each member state is to take whatever steps are necessary to-
ensure the observance of  minimum standards. The Commission, which is to be 
informed on measures  taken to this effect  and on contemplated measures  is. 
expected  to  make  recommendations  to  harmonize  such measures.  Should a 
member state  propose to conduct particularly dangerous experiments, it must 
first consult the Commission on additional health precautions to be taken. The 
approval of the Commission is  required concerning these precautions if the 
experiments are likely to affect the territory of other member states. 
Each member state is  to establish on its territory the installations necessary 
for control. The Commission is to have access to such installations. The Com-· 
mission is also to be kept informed on all plans to dispose of  radioactive waste, 
and the Commission, in tum, will in its discretion communicate to the member 
states views and recommendations which it deems pertinent. In an emergency,. 
it may issue a directive with which the member state will be  bound to comply.,. 
within a time fixed by the Commission; should the government fail to comply,. 
the Commission can bring the matter immediately before the Court of  Justice. 
4.  Supply and Control of Nuclear Material 
Ores, raw materials and special fissile materials are defined in the Treaty (as. 
in the Treaty of  the International Atomic Agency) and can be adapted to scientific 
and technical evolution by the Council, voting by a prescribed majority, on a 
proposal submitted by the Commission.  22 These materials are unequally divided 
among the member states. The world market for them is a highly specialized one, 
and the industries in the Community likely to take an interest in the development 
of  nuclear energy have little experience with this market. Centralization of  trade 
as regards all nuclear industries of the Community will give Euratom a strong 
position on the world market, will make possible a joint supply policy, and will 
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pooled. Moreover, nuclear materials, and most particularly special fissile materials, 
:are dangerous products, and as  such their traffic is to be strictly supervised for 
reasons of public safety. That is why the organization and the tasks of Euratom 
in the field of supply cannot be separated from those relating to ownership of 
special fissile materials and to supervision of safety measures. 
23 
(a)  The  Supply Agency-The mission of Euratom in relation to materials is 
entrusted, in the first instance, to the Commission and through it to a special 
agency which is  provided for in the Euratom Treaty. The agency is to play a 
central part in commercial operations involving ores and nuclear materials in the 
Community. Enjoying legal personality and financial autonomy, the Agency is 
to be administered like a business in conformity with a charter adopted by the 
Council, voting by a prescribed majority, on a proposal submitted by the Com-
mission. The greater part of  its capital will belong either to the Community and 
to the member states, or to both.  It is  placed under the strict control of the 
Commission, which  appoints  its  Director, issues  directives  to it, and enjoys 
the right of veto as well as that of amending its decisions. 
The Agency's activities are supported by two fundamental rights: a right of 
option over the ores and nuclear materials produced in the Community, and the 
exclusive right to conclude contracts for the supply of  ores and nuclear materials 
-originating from within the Community or from without. 
All producers of  the Community are required to offer the Agency the ores or 
nuclear materials they produce in the territories of  the member states. However, 
the producer who on his own or with other enterprises linked with him processes 
materials through several stages of  production, from the extraction of  the ore up 
to and including the production of  the final metal, may offer his products to the 
Agency at any of  the stages of  production he chooses. The only condition is that 
the producer who  wishes  to  take  advantage  of this  privilege  must keep  the 
Commission fully informed of his activities and arrangements. 
The Agency is to exercise its right of  option by concluding contracts with the 
producers.  If it does  not exercise  its  option,  the producer  may  process  his 
product and offer it afterwards to the Agency.  He may also be authorized, by 
decision of the Commission, to export his product on terms which must not be 
more favourable than those he offered to the Agency. The Agency cannot exercise 
its right of  option over the special fissile materials produced in the Community, 
in the cases described in paragraph (b) below. 
Thanks to this right of  option, the Agency can conclude all supply contracts 
concerning ores and materials produced within the Community. It also has the 
exclusive right to conclude agreements and conventions having as  their main 
object the supply of ores and of nuclear materials originating outside the Com-
munity. However, if  the Agency is unable to fulfil an order for supplies, either 
in whole or in part, within a reasonable period, or is  able to fulfil  it only  at 
exorbitant  prices,  the  Commission  may  authorize  a  user  to  make  a  direct 169  EURATOM 
¢On tract, provided always that the Commission is notified of such contracts; the 
Commission may oppose their conclusion if  they are contrary to the aims of  the 
Treaty.  This safety  valve  gives  the  user  the opportunity of trying to prove, 
subject  to  approval  of the  Commission,  the deficiencies  of the  Agency.  It 
provides a practical guarantee against any monopolistic abuse on the part of the 
Agency. 
Thus assured· of the power to conclude contracts for the supply of products 
available inside and outside the Community, the Agency periodically  collects 
information on all offers and detailed supply requirements of ores and nuclear 
materials. It makes known to all potential users the conditions under which it can 
fulfil the needs of users  and producers.  In case the Agency is  unable to fulfil 
orders completely, it is to allocate available supplies in proportion as orders are 
received. (Certain noteworthy exceptions to this system of supply are described 
in Note 24 at the end of this chapter.) 
The interplay of  supply and demand through the Agency is expected freely to 
determine prices. However, the Agency may put forward to users proposals for 
the equalization of  prices. An arbitrary fixing of  prices can only be decided by the 
Council, voting unanimously on a proposal submitted by the Commission. 
In all its activities, the Agency is bound to respect, and to enforce respect for, 
the principle of  equal access. In particular it may not discriminate between users 
on the grounds of the use they intend to make of the supplies requested unless 
such use is illicit. The Agency must fulfil every order received, unless  there are 
legal or material obstacles to execution. Finally, the Agency must report to the 
Commission any price manipulation designed to ensure a privileged position for 
certain users, contrary to the principles defined in the Treaty. In case of a con-
flict over prices, the Commission may restore the latter to a level compatible with 
the principle of equal access. 
All these measures regulate and supervise within the Community commercial 
transactions  relating to  ores  and nuclear materials from  inside or outside the 
Community. But the Agency is not authorized to alter the users' orders, except 
for the origin of imported products and for quantities delivered, when demand 
exceeds supply. Users are bound to act through the medium of  the Agency, but 
they are free to set their own requirements and the terms of  their orders. They 
will be able to make an informed choice because the Agency is required to inform 
them on all offers  of available  products it has  been able to collect.  Although 
regulated and centralized, the exchange of ores and nuclear materials remains 
essentially in the hands of producers and of users. (A few special provisions of 
limited scope forming the exceptions to this system are described in Note 25  at 
the end of this chapter.) 
(b) Special nuclear materials-The system described above applies equally to 
ores and to nuclear materials. But because of the added risks involved, special 
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In the first place, following the precedent set by America and Britain in this 
respect, special fissile materials either produced or imported are the property of 
Euratom.  There are only two  exceptions: the case of special  fissile  materials 
having a military character which puts them beyond Euratom's control under the 
conditions  described  below,  and  that  of materials  which  are imported into 
the Community only temporarily for a given project, and are to be returned tG 
the sender. Ownership by Euratom leaves the normal possessor the fullest rights 
to use and consume these materials, subject to the obligations imposed on him by 
the provisions of  the Treaty. To simplify the Community's problem of  financing 
as a result of  this system of  ownership, the Agency keeps, on behalf of  the Com-
munity, a special account for special fissile material. This account is administered 
as a current account between Euratom on one hand, and all the users on the other, 
the Agency acting as a user; balances are to be payable immediately on request of 
the creditor. This system of ownership will reduce operating complications to a 
minimum while maintaining in Euratom a special right. 
In the second place the possible uses  of special fissile  materials are to be 
strictly controlled. They can only be stocked by the Agency itself  or by a producer 
with the authorization of  the Agency. The Commission may require that they be 
deposited with the Agency or placed in storage premises which are to be or can 
be controlled by the Commission. Special fissile materials may not be exported 
save with  the authorization of the  Commission, which is  to  examine the pro-
posed contracts in the light of  the Treaty's objectives and of  the general interests 
of Euratom. 
A supply priority is recognized when the Agency waives its right of option. 
Special fissile materials are to be left in the possession of  the producer, either to-
make use of these products within the limits of his requirements, or to make 
them available, within the limits of  others' requirements, to firms with which the 
producer has a direct agreement for the purpose of carrying out a programme 
about which the Commission has been notified. However, this priority right does 
not apply if agreements  between  enterprises  have  the intent or the effect of 
limiting production, technical development, or investments, or of  creating unfair 
inequalities between the users of the Community. 
(c) Controls-Observance of rules concerning materials is imperative for all 
concerned from a commercial point of view, and for the Community from the· 
point of  view of  safety. That is why strict control is to be established. Its organiza-
tion follows  closely  the control  agency  of the  International Atomic  Agency: 
declaration  to  the  Commission  of the  technical  characteristics  of the  plants 
designed for production, separation or any other utilization of  nuclear materials; 
approval by the Commission of processes to be used for the chemical treatment 
of irradiated materials;  accounting for  ores and nuclear materials; .  a corps of· 
inspectors appointed by the Commission and having access to any premises in_ 
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If  a violation is verified, the Commission can issue a directive enjoining the 
member state in question to take within a prescribed period all measures neces-
sary to put an end to the violation, after which period the Commission must 
promptly bring the matter before the Court of  Justice. The Commission m:ay also 
impose direct penalties against persons and enterprises guilty of infringements. 
These penalties can include the withdrawal of  special advantages, either technical 
or financial,  the placing of the firm  under a provisional administration for  a 
maximum period of  four months, or even the withdrawal of nuclear materials. 
Exercise of  these powers is limited to the pursuance of  the three objectives of 
control.  The first  concerns  the application of supply regulations  which have 
already been described. 
The second seeks  to present diversion of ores  and nuclear materials from 
their intended use as stated by the users. This formula implies a free determina-
tion of  the ultimate destination of  the product, which determination the Treaty 
itself does not limit in any other way. Military uses as such are not forbidden by 
the Euratom Treaty. The Treaty·is content to stipulate that control is  not to 
extend to material intended for the purposes of defence that is  being specially 
processed for such purposes, or which after being processed, is, in accordance 
with an operational plan, deposited or stocked in a military establishment. But 
·once  they have  acquired  a  military  character,  these  materials  are  subject to 
armaments  controls.  Where the control of Euratom ceases  to  operate,  other 
international  organisms  are  expected  to  begin  functioning.  Moreover,  even 
nuclear materials intended from the beginning for military purposes are sub-
mitted to  the ordinary rules  of supply, i.e.  have  to  pass  through Euratom's 
Agency.  This is  the means of preserving the total control of nuclear materials 
which is one of the principal concerns of Euratom and its member states. 
The third objective of control by Euratom is to ensure the observance of all 
special agreements relating to control entered into by the Community with an 
outside state, or with an international organization. Only time can tell how far 
the extension of Euratom's control will go in this respect. 
(d) Amendments-This body of provisions  relating to  supply,  control and 
ownership has been established a priori, as it has not been possible to make refer-
·ence to any experience in this field in several member states. These provisions 
are linked to a certain stage of  the development of  industrial and legal techniques. 
Under these conditions, the member states have reserved their right to amend, 
should circumstances  justify it,  the  system  established  by the Treaty.  Such 
.amendment can be made by the Council, voting unanimously on a proposal sub-
mitted by the Commission, after consulting  the Assembly; any  member state 
_may also initiate procedures for such amendment. In any case, the Council will 
have to confirm or amend the supply regulations at the end of  seven years. 
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On the basis of  the provisions described above, the Commission must deter-
mine its supply policy. In order to regulate supply, the Agency may build up its 
stocks. Furthermore, available resources must be increased. As regards resources 
within the Community, the Commission may contribute to the development of 
prospection and exploitation of  ores. It can participate in their financing, within 
its budgetary limits. Moreover, if  the Council feels a member state is not making 
the necessary  effort in that domain,  it may  withdraw from  this  state  or  its 
nationals the right of equal access to the internal resources of the Community 
produced by other member states. 
An import policy toward outside countries and international organizations is 
all the more imperative since quantities presently produced in the Community 
are relatively small and since one must expect a certain amount of orders for 
resources from outside the Community. The supply policy on this point is closely 
linked to Euratom's external policy. 
*  *  *  *  * 
5.  Foreign Agreements 
For the creation and rapid expansion of a powerful nuclear industry in the 
Community, important assistance must be sought abroad in  the form of  scientists 
and experienced technicians, of  information, of equipment and of  materials. To 
pave the way for the exchanges throughout the world which the development of 
this industry will make possible in the future, contacts, negotiations, and agree-
ments  appear  imperative  now.  Euratom cannot reach  its  objectives  without 
a broad, coherent external policy. The Treaty has sought to provide Euratom  with 
the necessary means.  26 
The right of the Community to conclude international agreements or con-
ventions is expressly recognized by the member states. Obviously, this right is 
recognized only within the general framework  of the powers  conferred uppn 
Euratom. Two categories of agreements are established. Agreements having an 
object exclusively within the authority'  delegated to the Community are negotiated 
and concluded by the common institutions. They are binding for the member 
states and their nationals, under the same conditions and to the same degree as 
would be internal acts of the common institutions bearing on the same objects. 
Agreements having an object which does not come solely under the Community's 
authority, but is  also related to matters left within the power of the member 
states, require the joint participation of the Community and of these states. A 
commitment by the Commission is not enough for such agreements; their coming 
into force must wait until all required national procedures have been concluded 
in each member state party to such agreement. 
Whether the object of the agreement calls for the participation of member 
states at the side of  Euratom or not, the Community is always represented in the 
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latter negotiates in accordance with directives given by the Council, and before 
concluding negotiations, must obtain the approval of  the Council, voting with a 
prescribed majority. However, the Commission may negotiate and conclude on its 
own, provided the Council is  kept informed, the agreements it can carry out 
within the Community without intervention of the Council, even with the view 
of  obtaining new budgetary credits. The division of  community powers between 
the Council and the Commission is  therefore not affected by the internal or 
external character of the acts in question. 
Enjoying the right of  making international commitments on its own, Euratom 
is  further authorized to examine the compatibility of international agreements 
concluded by the member states or their nationals with the general provisions of 
the Treaty.  Provisions of the Treaty may  not be invoked against agreements 
concluded before its  entry into force  and communicated to the Commission 
before January 31, 1958, unless these agreements have been concluded during 
the period between the signature and the entry into force of  the Treaty. In the 
latter event, the Treaty can be invoked if  the Court of  Justice, to which the Com-
mission presents the case, is of  the opinion that the intention to circumvent the 
provisions of the Treaty has been one of the motives of either of the parties. 
Conclusion or renewal of  international agreements after January 1, 1958, must 
take the Treaty into account. Member states must notify the Commission of  any 
proposed agreements so far as they fall within the scope of the Treaty. In the 
case of  an objection by the Commission, the member state may request the Court 
of Justice to make an expeditious determination of the compatibility of  the pro-
posed clauses with the provisions of  the Treaty. For motives of  practicability, and 
in the case of at least some member states, for motives of  principle, international 
agreement  entered  into  by  nationals  of member  states  are  not subject  to 
pre-control of the Commission. But this  device  cannot be used  as  justifying 
non-compliance with the Treaty. The Commission may request from member 
states full information enabling it to verify the compatibility of  agreements with 
the provisions of the Treaty, and as the case may be, to ask the Court of  Justice 
to give option on the question of compatibility. 
While endowing Euratom with these means of  action, the Treaty also enables 
it to assign three objectives to its external policy: 
(a)  The  establishment  of sound relationships  with outside  countries  and inter-
national organizations21- The Treaty specially provides for the establishment of 
useful contacts with international bodies, the UNO and GATT in particular, and 
of  a close co-operation with international organizations, the Council of  Europe and 
most specially the OEEC. Contacts with outside countries, which may be given 
the  most  flexible  forms  and established according  to  a  broad concept,  may 
eventually bring about the appointment to Euratom of  an accredited mission, or 
an exchange of  representatives. It has, indeed, brought about, in February 1958, 
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(b) The development of co-operation agreements with outside countries or inter-
national organizations in the field of  peaceful use of  atomic energy-These provisions 
of  the Treaty place Euratom at the centre of  international co-operation. Euratom 
may offer outside countries participation either in the execution of its research 
programmes, or in the joint enterprises which are created; it controls agreements 
of a state character relating to information, as well as to imports and exports of 
ores and nuclear materials. Euratom may also conclude co-operation agreements 
in the field of nuclear energy, and to this end enter into special agreements as 
regards safety controls. To give greater strength to Euratom in this respect, the 
Treaty makes it obligatory for member states to negotiate, in conjunction with the 
Commission, transfer to the Community of  rights and duties arising from agree-
ments on nuclear co-operation concluded with outside countries before the entry 
into force of the Treaty. New co-operation agreements concluded as a result of 
these negotiations require the consent of  member states and the approval of the 
Council voting with the prescribed majority. 
Independent from these co-operation agreements of classical type, Euratom 
may conclude broader agreements destined to create a true association, close and 
lasting in character, for the development of nuclear energy. To this effect the 
Treaty provides that the Community may conclude with an  outside  state,  a 
union of states or an international organization, agreements creating an associa-
tion characterized by mutual rights  and obligations,  joint action, and special 
procedures. Such an agreement is to be concluded by the Council, voting unani-
mously,  after  consultation  with the Assembly.  The intervention of member 
states as such is not required save in the case where amendment of the Treaty 
appears necessary.  28 
(c) The extension of the Community  to  other European states-Any European 
state may ask to join Euratom.  29 The Council, after seeking the opinion of the 
Commission, takes a decision on such a request by a unanimous vote. 
Admission of  a new member requires that the Treaty be amended, at least as 
regards institutional clauses, and particularly the clause on weighted votes in the 
Council. Since the issue of  the internal balance of the Community is raised, the 
intervention of  the member states is required for the conclusion of the necessary 
agreements with the state applying for admission, such agreements having to be 
ratified by all of the contracting states. 
*  *  *  *  * 
Euratom is  not an exclusive  agency  for  international efforts  intended to 
encourage, facilitate and control the peaceful development of nuclear energy. In 
Europe the International Atomic  Energy Agency  and the European Nuclear 
Energy Agency are also active. Within different geographic regions, performing 
in the  ~nner  of  concentrical circles, the three organizations are to pursue similar 175  EURATOM 
objectives: they are to  stimulate and support research and teaching, improve 
supplies, and ensure  security.  Sometimes, they are to  apply almost  identical 
methods,  in  matters  of control  for  example.  Means  of action  provided  by 
Euratom and the European Nuclear Energy Agency are frequently analogous: 
for instance, in the setting of  standards for the protection of  health, the eventual 
creation of  enterprises or joint plants, and the development of  nuclear exchanges. 
These common traits, however, cannot hide obvious differences. For instance, 
it is  evident that to achieve  their purpose in the field  of nuclear energy,  the 
member states have accepted heavier burdens and more strictly defined restric-
tions in Euratom than in any of  the other organizations. The creation of a joint 
research centre, the careful establishment of voluntary or coercive procedures 
for the pooling of  information, the creation of  a supply Agency which collects and 
controls  exchanges  of ores  and nuclear materials,  joint ownership  of special 
fissile materials, the pursuit of  a joint external policy-these are the traits which 
are the proof of Euratom's originality and the guarantee of its strength. These 
characters single out Euratom from the other organizations, but they do not set it 
apart from them. On the contrary, the broadness of the missions and extent of 
the powers of  Euratom make close agreement with the International Agency and 
the European Agency both easier and more useful.  Experience will gradually 
provide objects and indicate limits. 
Still it must be said that certain differences between Euratom and the other 
international organizations are deep-rooted. Opportunities open to Euratom are 
greater because the member states have agreed to establish a closer union among 
themselves. The member states have not been content with the institution of  an 
international organization to animate and control activities; they have not been 
content with an organization empowered to make  proposals  and to interpose 
itself between states who still reserve for themselves a sovereign right as regards 
a final decision. The member states of Euratom bind themselves by rules and put 
themselves in the hands of joint institutions in order to reach their objectives. 
The very broadness and urgency of  the task before them has made them decide to 
pool their efforts, and they have agreed to provide the unity of  decision which is a 
fundamental condition to such a pooling. Thus they have applied to a civilian 
international  effort  a  classic  principle  of military  alliances,  that of a  unified 
command. 
Five years ofE.C.S.C. experience have shown that such daring, if  the source 
of  problems, is also the source of  solutions. The change in capacities and in needs, 
the comparing of tendencies and structures varied and sometimes contradictory, 
the scientific and technical requirements of  nuclear industries, make it necessary 
to  seek  a  new  economic  equilibrium  through  joint  effort.  According  to  the 
provisions of  the Treaty, Euratom is to find this equilibrium through an associa-
tion  of enterprises,  both  public  and  private,  with  the  common  institutions. 
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the means for a full contribution to the joint effort. Euratom encourages initiatives 
and inspires the free action of  enterprises by setting up a nuclear common market, 
organizing the dissemination of  information, providing equal access to supplies, 
collecting  and communicating, publicly whenever possible,  all  data  useful  to 
research  and  investments.  The institutions of Euratom  prevent  the  general 
interests of  the Community from being disregarded, by means of  security control, 
standards for the protection of  health, the centralization of  supply operations, the 
pursuit of a joint external policy, the right to complement by its own action 
research pursued within the Community territory and to exploit discoveries or 
operate industrial plants in the absence of action on the part of private enter-
prises. All acting within well-defined responsibilities, proper to their respective 
character, the institutions and enterprises should be able to achieve together the 
objectives of  the Community, through a trusting co-operation which is a requisite 
of success. 
The efforts that have become necessary to the creation and rapid expansion 
of a powerful common nuclear industry are centred in member states which are 
very  different  in their  characteristics.  The combining  of the institutions  of 
integrated Europe is  intended to surmount ·all types of obstacles arising from 
these  differences.  Minds  familiar  with  federal  structures  will  have  recog-
nized both the inspired character and the weakness  of Euratom's institutional 
organization. 
· The transfer of sovereignties to ·the Community by member states, manda-
tory powers entrusted to the common institutions,  provide the very heart of 
Euratom  with federal  mechanisms.  Concluded for  an  unlimited  period,  the 
Euratom Treaty creates a permanent institution system similar to the conventions 
upon which federal states are founded.  Since the Treaty cannot be renounced, 
it must be open to amendment. Amendments do not always  require the inter-
vention of  the member states; the Council, voting unanimously after consultation 
with the Assembly, and acting on a proposal submitted by the Commission, can, 
as  we  have observed, amend the provisions of the Treaty relating to supply, 
control and ownership.  Under the same  conditions,  it can  take  those  steps 
necessary to the achievement of the objectives of  the Community, not provided 
by the Treaty.30 
The nature of the institutions of Euratom, however, and the distribution of 
powers among them, conform but in part to the classic pattern of  federal states. 
At times, the Council appears to share the exercise of legislative or even con-
stituent power; it amends or completes the provisions of  the Treaty, enacts rules, 
and sets standards. Although comparable in this respect to a federal Senate, it is 
actually  very  different.  The use  of weighted votes  for  member states  or the 
requirement of unanimity  in voting, often emphasizes the  Intergovernmental 
character of the Council more than that of a Community institution. At other 
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political responsibility.  As  a Community institution, it cannot be overthrown 
by national  parliaments.  As  an  Intergovernmental  body,  it is  not held  res-
ponsible  to  the Assembly.  Such an  abnormal  situation  might encourage  the 
development  of an irresponsible  bureaucracy if  the decisions  of the Council 
were  not  taken  by  members  of national  governments  whose  parliamentary 
background  and  national  governmental  responsibilities  protect  them  against 
temptation. 
The peculiarities of  the Council stress those of  an Assembly which does not 
exercise  constituent and legislative power, and which has  no control over the 
institution empowered to take the most important executive decisions-except 
through vote of censure. True, the Assembly exercises a parliamentary control 
over the Commission. The latter is at the centre of  the action of  Euratom, by the 
exercise of its own powers as  much as  by the obligation in which the Council 
finds  itself in most cases  where it is  competent to take a decision  on a pro-
posal  submitted by the Commission.  Whilst escaping direct political control, 
the Council is thus open to the indirect criticism of the Assembly through the 
medium of the Commission,  and to that of national Parliaments through the 
medium of the members of  the governments seated in the Council. Under these 
conditions, harmony and action depend essentially on the authority of  the Com-
mission, constant animator of the Community and link between the Assembly 
and the Council. 
In the end, the Court of Justice alone enjoys a sovereign community power, 
like a federal supreme court. Thus it can contribute importantly to the definition 
and application of a common rule of  law for Euratom. 
The insitutional anomalies we have found are not surprising. Euratom is not 
a federal state, but the European Atomic Energy Community. We would seek in 
vain in the present European Communities, which are merely economic, a totally 
rational federal construction, as this would imply the pooling of  political power to 
which the six founding countries of Euratom have not yet agreed. However, we 
must not underestimate the scope of their enterprise. In this respect, as we said 
at  the  outset,  Euratom  cannot  be  examined  separately  from  the  European 
Economic Community and the Coal and Steel Community. Europe is given new 
dimensions  by the close  union of the three Communities, indispensable to  a 
coherent  economic  policy  and made  inevitable  by the  existence  of common 
institutions. This is  a qualitive change-not just a changing of scale-in order 
to find solutions to economic problems greater than the possibilities of nations 
when they act by themselves. 
Europeans are drawing from this contemporary revolution a clear insight and 
renewed vigour which is  transforming the face  of Europe. Together with the 
other Communities, Euratom is proof  that Europeans know how to unite in order 
to create. While stimulating in Western Europe both the development of  nuclear 
industries  and the aspiration  of men  towards  unity,  Euratom  contributes  to MtCH~L GAt1D:et  178 
releasing tWo great sources of energy, the latter being the more powerful and, if 
correctly understood, the more necessary to world peace as well as to Europeans 
themselves. 
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28.  Euratom Treaty, Art. 206. 
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